There is also a historical link between the strong and weak versions. Consider Anatole`s sarcastic mockery France the vain pretext of the equality of the law: “The majestic equality of laws that forbid rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, beg in the streets, and steal their bread.” 118 The France seems to emphasize that laws prohibiting vagrancy, begging and theft are not general. To be clear, major social phenomena such as poverty are features of the system as a whole. Criticizing poverty does not mean that the endowment of every poor person is reprehensible from the point of view of the rule of law, but that the entire legal-economic structure of society is reprehensible because it allows there to be a caste of poor people and then imposes legal sanctions on that caste.149 Normally, the law presupposes that citizens can satisfy their basic needs only on the basis that: that there are others. Citizens have private property rights over the instruments with which they can be satisfied. This is the crux of the discussion on the law against food theft: since citizens must eat to live, a law prohibiting food theft must require that all citizens have the legal means to acquire enough food to survive, otherwise the law becomes a status crime that violates the rule of law. And since laws against theft are in part constitutive of property rights, it follows that any society that creates private property rights over the resources necessary to meet the basic needs of life must count those resources into its social minimum.135 Second, confuses the moral evaluation of people (the racists in the legislature) with the moral evaluation of institutions (the racist laws). These two judgments should not be combined; It is entirely plausible that they will collapse – bad people with bad intentions can make good laws, and good people with good intentions can make bad laws. And in the face of evil social institutions, we should be able to criticize those institutions independently of those who imposed them. For a reason, institutions can outlive their creators, and future generations should be able to criticize them through no one being accountable.98 Nor am I the first to suggest that something like public reason can also be used in non-democratic states to give the reasons by which they can distinguish their citizens. A prototype of the idea goes back at least as far as Hobbes, the great defender of monarchy, who nevertheless insists that legal differences between classes of citizens are based on the common good: equality before the law is a principle of some branches of feminism. In the 19th century, gender equality before the law was a radical goal, but some later feminist views argue that formal legal equality is not enough to create real and social equality between women and men. An ideal of formal equality can punish women who do not adhere to a masculine norm, while an ideal of different treatment can reinforce gender stereotypes.
 It is particularly advisable to base our moral assessment of a legal institution on the bad intentions of those who created it for two reasons. First, legal institutions generally emerge from the combined action of several actors, who may not have all acted for the same reasons. Laws and the institutions that create them are products of politics, which in turn is the realm of compromise; The fact that only one legislature voted for a law does not mean that that legislature shared intentions with others who voted for it, or that it wanted the consequences.96 Moreover, social choice theorists have shown that legislative outcomes cannot reliably follow even the simple preferences of legislative majorities.97 The legalistic philosopher Guan Zhong (720-645 BC) stated: that “the monarch and his subjects, however great and small, the law shall be the great order.”  A related objection asks why these claims must be linked to the ideal of the rule of law. I would say that those who are committed to the rule of law have also pledged to support the strong ideas on social equality developed in this article, but perhaps those who want to resist this argument can simply deny that the strong version of the rule of law is part of what they are committed to. Why not reject the general public altogether, or at least treat the strong and weak versions of the rule of law as two independent principles that do not have to be accepted or rejected together?143 (Call this the objection to independence.) There are several consequences of this principle of natural equality of human beings. I will quickly look at the most important ones. In many countries, politicians, businessmen and other powerful and wealthy people emerge unscathed from their crimes. If a politician in a country is not even questioned about his corrupt nature and people literally applaud him and re-elect him, there is obviously no legal equality in such a country.
The foregoing shows that a State`s respect for the principle of generality cannot be inferred from legal texts or even from observation of the relationship between its legal texts and the practices of its officials. In the most abstract statement of this point, because generality is an expressive ideal, and because the expressive content of any act is at least partially conventional and depends on social meanings which themselves depend on social facts, our assessment of whether or not a law is open to criticism will depend in part on the social conditions prevailing when it is in force.113 The main task of a theory of Legal equality is to: design a test for non-discriminatory classifications. This chapter argues that no version of a “theory” per se can be satisfactory. Relevance-based tests are more attractive, although they give a circularity that results from the temptation to imply the purpose of classification from the classification concepts themselves. This hazard can be overcome by increasing the degree of control of the objective and the correspondence between the classification and the goal. However, we need good reasons to increase the scrutiny of legislation, and these reasons must be incorporated into a general theory, which makes classification discriminatory. An intuitively justified answer to this question seems to be that classification is tainted by certain erroneous grounds of legislation as discriminatory, especially when the legislation is based on prejudice, hostility and stereotypes. As I will argue in a few paragraphs, examining the explicit meaning of a law is rationalist, as it amounts to an examination of the reasons associated with a law, and constructive in attributing those reasons to holders of multiple views on the law, based on the reasons that apply to the people in those positions. That is, it attributes reasons related to agents to legal actors. It follows that the attribution of the grounds on which they might support a particular law implies both the logical space of the expressive meaning of that law and the exhaustion of the possible public reasons for that law. Public questions of reason and expressive questions of meaning, when the dust has settled, turn out to be the same thing. Since we usually say that the principle of generality encompasses the idea of equality before the law, and since the rule of law as a whole is best understood as a regulatory principle aimed at preserving equality in political communities, the criterion of relevance that allows us to apply the requirement of the general public should capture the idea, that the subjects of the law must be treated equally.40 Thus, I argued in the previous paper that a law is general for the purposes of the rule of law only to the extent that the distinctions it makes between citizens are justified on public grounds, as John Rawls did.41 That is, such a law is general only to the extent that: in which it can be justified by reasons that those it selects can accept.
as equal citizens and not as inferior citizens.42 Here I say something more for this position.